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Abstract: Opting out of state standardized tests has recently become a movement—a series of 
grassroots, organized efforts to refuse to take high-stakes state standardized tests. In particular, the 
opt-out rates in the state of New York reached 20% in 2015 and 21% in 2016. This study aims to 
illustrate the social networks and examine the paradoxes that have propelled the opt-out movement 
in New York—the movement’s epicenter with the highest opt-out rate in the United States. 
Drawing on the conceptual frameworks of social movement theory, social network theory, and 
policy paradox, this study compiled the opt-out corpus by using the data from 221 press-coverage 
and 30 archival documents. Social network analysis was performed by examining the relational data 
that suggest coalition ties between movement actors. Further, to explicate how the movement actors 
forged coalition ties, all data in the corpus were then coded by Stone’s framework of policy paradox 
regarding how the movement goals were articulated, how the movement was framed, and what 
policy solutions were mobilized. In addition to identifying the movement actors and two competing 
coalitions, it is found that to forge coalition ties, the movement actors in the opposing coalitions 
articulated contested goals of standardized testing, framed the movement via symbols, numbers, and 
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interests, as well as mobilized policy solutions via inducements, rights, and power. The findings have 
important and timely implications for policymakers and movement actors as they seek and advance 
on common ground to make substantive changes in education policy.  
Keywords: Common Core State Standards; education policy; network analysis; opt-out 
movement; policy paradox; social movement; social networks; standardized testing 
 
Las redes sociales y las paradojas del movimiento opt-out entre la implementación 
de los estándares estatales Common Core: El caso de Nueva York 
Resumen: La exclusión de las pruebas estandarizadas estatales se ha convertido 
recientemente en un movimiento organizado para rehusarse a tomar pruebas estatales de 
alto riesgo. El índice de opt-out en el estado de Nueva York llego a 20% en 2015 y a 21% 
en 2016. Este estudio ilustra  redes sociales y examina las paradojas que han promovido el 
movimiento opt-out en Nueva York, el epicentro con el índice más alto de opt-out en los 
Estados Unidos. Este estudio examina cómo los actores del movimiento crearon lazos de 
la coalición, cómo se articularon los objetivos del movimiento, cómo se enmarcó el 
movimiento y cuales soluciones de polítiza se utilizaron en la teoría de los movimientos 
sociales, la teoría de las redes sociales y la paradoja de las políticas fueron movilizados. De 
acuerdo con este estudio, para poder crear conexiones de coalición, los actores del 
movimiento en coaliciones opuestas articularon objetivos disputados de pruebas 
estandarizadas, enmarcaron el movimiento a través de símbolos, números e intereses, así 
como soluciones de políticas movilizadas a través de incentivos, derechos y poderes. Los 
hallazgos tienen implicaciones importantes y oportunas para los formuladores de políticas 
y los actores del movimiento a medida que buscan un terreno común para realizar cambios 
sustantivos en la política educativa. 
Palabras-clave: Common Core; política educativa; análisis de red; movimiento opt-out; 
paradoja de la política; movimiento social; redes sociales; evaluación  
 
As redes sociais e os paradoxos do movimento opt-out entre a implementação do 
normas estaduais Common Core: O caso de Nova York 
Resumo: A exclusão de testes estaduais padronizado tornou-se recentemente uma 
organizada se recusam a tomar testes estaduais movimento de alto risco. A taxa de opt-out 
no estado de Nova York atingiu 20% em 2015 e 21% em 2016. Este estudo ilustra as redes 
sociais e examina os paradoxos que promoveram o movimento opt-out, em Nova York, o 
epicentro com o índice maior opt-out nos Estados Unidos. Este estudo analisa como os 
atores do movimento criado laços de coalizão, como os objetivos do movimento foram 
articulados, como o movimento foi enquadrado e que soluções apólice de seguro de carro 
usado na teoria dos movimentos sociais, a teoria das redes sociais e políticas paradoxo 
foram mobilizados. De acordo com este estudo, a fim de criar conexões de coalizão, os 
atores se movem em coalizões opostas objetivos disputadas teste padronizado articulados, 
enquadrado o movimento através de símbolos, números e interesses e soluções políticas 
mobilizados por meio de incentivos, direitos e poderes. Os resultados têm importante e 
oportuna para os decisores políticos e actores do movimento como eles procurar um 
terreno comum para mudanças substantivas nas implicações políticas educacionais. 
Palavras-chave: Common Core; política educativa; análisis de red; movimiento opt-out; 
paradoja de la política; movimiento social; redes sociales; evaluación  
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Introduction 
The purpose of this study is to illustrate the social networks and examine the paradoxes that 
have propelled the opt-out movement in the state of New York. Opting out of state standardized 
tests is nothing new. However, with the Common Core State Standards implementation, opting out 
is no longer an isolated case. Rather, it has become a movement—the grassroots, organized efforts 
to refuse to take high-stakes standardized tests (Bennett, 2016). Nearly half of the respondents 
(48.9%) to the recent national survey on the opt-out movement suggests that they joined the 
movement between 2014 and 2015 (Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016). For some, 2015 was deemed 
as “the year of opting out”, as nationally over half a million students opted out of the state 
standardized tests. In particular, the opt-out movement in New York struck a “triumphant” note in 
2015, when unprecedentedly 20% (approximately 200,000) of eligible students in grades 3-8 opted 
out of the New York State Assessment (Ujifusa, 2015). This record-breaking opt-out rate was 
shattered again in 2016, when 21% of students (approximately 230,000) opted out of state 
standardized tests (The New York State Education Department, 2016).  
Portrayed as a grassroots movement, the opt-out movement has been considered as being 
led by parents (Mitra, Mann, & Hlavacik, 2016). However, parents did not launch or propel the 
movement singlehandedly (Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016). For instance, the teachers’ union 
robocalled its members to remind them of the option of opting out of state standardized tests 
(Brody, 2015); some nonprofit education advocacy organizations provided guides and contact 
information for the opt-out parents across the states. As a relatively new phenomenon, little is 
known about the opt-out movement. While the extant literature examined the movement at an 
aggregated national level, less is known about the movement at the state level. In fact, the opt-out 
movement momentum varies substantially from state to state. On one end of the spectrum, the high 
opt-out rates in 13 states in 2015 drew attention from the U.S. Department of Education (Strauss, 
2016); on the other end of the spectrum, 34 states and the District of Columbia did not allow opting 
out of state standardized tests (Lorenzo, 2015). Considering such substantial variations among states, 
this study therefore focuses on the movement’s epicenter in New York. Drawing upon social 
movement theory, social network theory, and Stone’s (2001) framework on policy paradox, this 
study seeks answers to four research questions:  
1. What were the social networks that have propelled the opt-out movement in New 
York? 
2. What goals were articulated by the opt-out movement’s major actors?  
3. How was the opt-out movement framed by the major actors? 
4. What policy solutions were mobilized by the major actors of the opt-out movement?  
 
The answers to these questions are particularly important as the movement in New York is not an 
isolated phenomenon. The opt-out rate in at least 13 states (California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, 
and Wisconsin) possibly exceeded 5% in 2015 (Strauss, 2016). Thus, an enriched understanding of 
the movement in New York makes an important and timely contribution by informing the 
movement actors across states, including educational leaders and policymakers, as they seek and 
advance on common ground and capitalize on the movement to make substantive changes in 
education policy for the interest of students.  
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Setting the Context of the Opt-out Movement 
To study the opt-out movement, we must start by setting the context. Nationally, the 
movement came to the fore in 2013 amid the implementation of the Common Core State Standards. 
Since the sweeping adoption of the Common Core in 2009 across the states, the Common Core and 
its implementation have met with growing resistance. This growing resistance to high-stakes 
standardized testing was detailed in the book More Than a Score: The New Uprising Against High-Stakes 
Testing, in which teachers, students, and parents shared their accounts of standardized testing 
(Hagopian, 2014). For teachers, the rise of the Badass Teachers Association was prompted by the 
shared belief held by those who “refuse to be blamed for the failure of our society to erase poverty 
and inequality, and refuse to accept assessments, tests and evaluations imposed by those who have 
contempt for real teaching and learning” (The Badass Teachers Association, 2013, para. 4). Also in 
2013, over 20 teachers in the Seattle Public Schools called a press conference, announcing their 
refusal to administer the Measures of Academic Progress (MAP) test (Naison, 2014). The district 
superintendent initially threatened the teachers with a ten-day suspension without pay, but later 
compromised and stated that high school students may opt out of the MAP test. The students in the 
Portland Student Union led a campaign of opting out of standardized testing (Garcia, 2014). The 
parent, Jeannette Deutermann, started the Facebook group of the Long Island Opt Out Info which 
attracted hundreds of group members within the first week (Deutermann, 2014). A recent study of 
over half of a million tweets with the hashtags #CommonCore and #CCSS in 2015 found that the 
Twitter users in all 50 states and the District of Columbia expressed negative sentiment towards the 
Common Core, regardless of whether or how long the states have adopted the Common Core 
(Wang & Fikis, 2016). Moreover, the hashtag #OptOut was one of the most frequently used 
hashtags by Twitter users in their discourse of the Common Core on Twitter. Further, the 2016 
PKD/Gallup poll showed nearly half (43%) of the public school parents supported opting out, 
suggesting a remarkable increase from 31% in the previous year of 2015 (Phi Delta Kappa 
International, 2015, 2016). Not only did the public discuss the Common Core adoption and its 
implementation in the form of state standardized tests, they also voted with their feet. Nationally, 
over 670,000 students, according to the National Center for Fair and Open Testing, opted out of 
high-stakes standardized tests in 2015 (FairTest, 2016).  
In the state of New York, the Common Core State Standards were adopted in 2010. New 
York became one of the first states to administer the Common Core-aligned tests in 2013. Then in 
2014, approximately 60,000 students opted out of the state standardized tests. In the year that 
followed, the number of the opt-out students quadrupled to approximately 240,000, far exceeding 
that in New Jersey—the state with the second largest number (130,000) of the opt-out students in 
the same year of 2015. The ensuing year brought much change to the opt-out movement in New 
York. In January 2016, the former New York State Education Commissioner John B. King Jr., who 
spearheaded the implementation of the Common Core, became the Secretary of Education (The 
U.S. Department of Education, 2016). In March 2016, three new members to the state Board of 
Regents were elected to join the 17-member board, in which the majority of the board members 
disagreed with the direction of the previous leadership under the former Education Commissioner 
John King and the former Regents Chancellor Merryl Tisch (Dewitt, 2016). Meanwhile, the newly 
elected Regents Chancellor Betty Rosa even offered verbal support for the opt-out movement by 
telling The Wall Street Journal reporter that, “If I was a parent and I had a child who was taking these 
exams, and I looked at the conditions that exist, obviously I would say yes, I would opt out” (The 
New York Daily News, 2016, para. 4). On the political front, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton 
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also took an interest in the opt-out movement. When interviewed by The Newsday, Hillary Clinton 
voiced her support for the Common Core, but described its implementation as “disastrous”, and 
further voiced her opposition to the opt-out movement (The Newsday, 2016).  
The existing research on the movement has been limited. Still, prior literature, which 
examined the movement at an aggregated national level, suggests that the movement emerged from 
the underlying tension surrounding the Common Core State Standards and high-stakes standardized 
testing (Bennett, 2016; Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016; Mitra et al., 2016). To direct attention to the 
social context of the movement (Bearman & Everett, 1993), this study focuses on the opt-out 
movement’s epicenter in New York to not only provide an inroads to understand the social 
networks that have propelled the movement, but also build upon prior movement network studies 
(e.g., Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016) by explicating how the coalition ties were forged through 
evoking the arguments on the movement’s goals, framing, and policy solutions.  
Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual underpinnings of this study is grounded in the literature intersecting social 
movement theory, social network theory, and policy paradox. In this section, I first applied social 
movement theory to conceptualize the opt-out movement, and then applied social network theory 
to operationalize the movement as the social networks composed of movement actors and their 
coalition ties. To further understand how the coalition ties were forged, I then draw on Stone’s 
(2001) framework of policy paradox to analyze how the movement goals were articulated, how the 
movement was framed, and what policy solutions were mobilized by the movement actors.  
Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Social Movements 
Social movement theory was used in this study to conceptualize the opt-out movement, and 
social network theory was used to operationalize the movement as the networks. Social movement 
theory posits that a social movement is a form of collective action that emerges from highly charged 
social contexts (Morris, 1984, 1999; Morris & Mueller, 1992). In such social contexts, there are many 
factors coming into play in mobilizing the social movement, including institutions and organizations, 
mobilizing structures, emotions manifested by collective enthusiasm, and the resultant collective 
action. Specifically, the institutions, either formal or informal organizations, create and coordinate 
collective action through communication and resource sharing channels. All these factors in a social 
movement can be operationalized as the social networks, as social network theory holds that actors 
are connected by their ties related to a given issue of interest (Borgatti & Everett, 1997; Saunders, 
2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Consequently, in social networks of a social movement, the 
institutions and organizations are considered as the movement actors which are connected by their 
coalition ties functioning as the channels to amass social capital by building alliances, coordinating 
efforts, and pooling resources (Coleman, 1990; Crossley & Ibrahim, 2012; Diani, 1995; Lin, 1999; 
Marwell & Oliver, 1993; Snow, Zurcher, & Ekland-Olson, 1980). In this study, the individuals and 
groups became the movement actors when they engaged in the movement through providing 
support or voicing opposition. For instance, the parents became the movement actors when they 
opted their children out of state standardized tests; the Long Island Opt Out group and the teachers’ 
unions became the movement actors when the teachers’ unions helped distribute the Long Island 
Opt Out group’s event fliers about boycotting state standardized tests (Ferrette, 2016); some civil 
rights groups became the actors when they issued a statement explicitly opposing the movement 
(Schweig, 2016); the High Achievement of New York, a pro-Common Core advocacy organization, 
became the movement actor when it told the reporters that its goal was for the majority of suburban 
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areas to participate in state standardized tests, instead of opting out (Donachie, 2016b). As a result, 
the institutions and organizations as the movement actors, along with their coalition ties, constitute 
the social networks of the opt-out movement; the network’s outcome is considered as the collective 
action of the opt-out movement.  
Coalition ties have been operationalized in an array of approaches in prior network analysis 
studies on social movements and policymaking. For instance, in the social networks accounting for 
the rise of civil society in Mexico, the coalition ties were operationalized as co-participation in 
protest campaigns together (Wada, 2014). The actors (i.e., workers, peasants, students, civic 
associations, and non-governmental organizations) were thus connected by the coalition ties if they 
co-attended a protest campaign. Moreover, in the networks of reading curriculum policymaking, the 
ties were operationalized as the collaborations or interactions between the actors (e.g., educational 
organizations, school districts, business or businesses associations, private reading consultants, and 
philanthropic foundations) (Song & Miskel, 2005, 2007; Song & Yong, 2008; Yong, Wang, & Lewis, 
2016). In the networks of charter school reform in the state of Washington, the ties were 
operationalized as the wealthy elites’ and their affiliated philanthropies’ financial ties through 
donation or contribution to the Yes on 1240 campaign (Au & Ferrare, 2014). Following the 
operationalizations of ties in prior literature, this study therefore considers a coalition tie exists if (1) 
the groups and organizations co-participate in an event regarding the opt-out movement, and/or (2) 
they collaborate or interact with one another in the movement. By doing so, the opt-out movement 
can be elucidated as the social networks, in which the movement actors are connected by the 
coalition ties functioning as the conduit to mobilize and coordinate resources in the movement. 
However, the social networks of the opt-out movement only illustrate whether the coalition ties 
exist. To further examine how the coalition ties were forged, this study then drew upon Stone’s 
(2001) framework of policy paradox to unpack the rich information hidden in the dichotomous ties 
of the opt-out movement’s social networks.  
Policy Paradox 
The axiom of Stone’s framework is that a policy is usually not created “in a fairly orderly 
sequence of stages” (Stone, 2001, p. 10), in which a problem is defined, and solutions are proposed, 
evaluated, selected, and implemented. Instead, policymaking “is a constant struggle over the criteria 
for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide the way people 
behave” (p. 11). As a result, the paradoxes are ubiquitous in three elements of policymaking—goals, 
problems, and policy solutions. The goals—the enduring values (e.g., equity, efficiency, security, and 
liberty)—are usually contradictory and are evoked to unite or divide people. The problems are 
defined and portrayed deliberately through symbols, numbers, causes, interests, and decisions to 
“win most people to one’s side and the most leverage over one’s opponents” (p. 133). The policy 
solutions—also called policy instruments (e.g., inducements, rules, facts, rights, and power)—are the 
“ongoing strategies for structuring relationships and coordinating behavior to achieve collective 
purposes” (p. 261). From the vantage point of policy paradox, this study examines what and how 
paradoxes were used by the movement actors to seek allies and build coalition ties in the movement. 
Specifically, this study focuses on how the goals were articulated, how the movement was framed, 
and how the policy solutions were mobilized in the movement.  
Methods 
To illustrate the social networks and examine the paradoxes that have propelled the opt-out 
movement, this study used the data collected from press coverage and archival documents to first 
conduct social network analysis to illustrate the social networks that have propelled the movement. 
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Next, a document analysis was performed to examine the paradoxes of the movement in terms of 
the movement goals, framing, and policy solutions. Here I present in detail the data collection 
procedures and analytic strategies used in this study. 
Data Sources 
Data for this study came from 221 press-coverage and 30 archival documents on the opt-out 
movement in New York—a state with the highest opt-out rate in the country, thereby garnering 
much media attention. A total of 221 press coverage is the primary data source for this study. This is 
because “media attention helps to define public understanding of a movement itself—who its 
leaders are, what it wants, and how it seeks to bring about social change” (Andrews & Caren, 2010, 
p. 841), rendering press coverage the well-suited data source to fulfill the purpose of this study. To 
collect the press coverage on the movement, the keywords “opt out”, “education”, and “New York” 
were used to set up Google Alerts to monitor and archive the press coverage of the movement on a 
daily basis from January 1 to August 31, 2016. The press coverage includes national liberal (e.g., The 
New York Times), centrist (e.g., Cable News Network), and conservative (e.g., Fox News) sources, as well 
as local sources such as The Long Island Press. For the purpose of this study of the opt-out movement, 
I included the press coverage only related to opting out of state standardized tests, and excluded the 
coverage on opting out of other issues, such as sexual education, religious education, and public 
school system.  
Next, the press coverage data on the opt-out movement were supplemented by 30 publicly 
available archival documents, adding to the reliability and credibility of the findings from this study. 
The documents were identified and included in this study if (1) their hyperlinks were inserted by the 
press coverage online, (2) the Google searches by the document names mentioned in the press 
coverage directed the researcher to where the documents were published online, and (3) they were 
germane to the opt-out movement in New York. By doing so, the archival documents were 
downloaded from the websites of an array of organizations (e.g., the U.S. Department of Education 
and the New York State Education Department) and groups (e.g., the United Opt Out, the Long 
Island Opt-out, and The Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights). Together, the 221 
press coverage and 30 archival documents make up the opt-out corpus. 
Data Analysis 
To identify the movement actors, social network analysis was performed by examining the 
relational data that suggest the coalition ties between the actors in the opt-out corpus. As noted 
earlier, the opt-out movement’s social networks are constituted of the movement actors and their 
coalition ties. Among the movement actors, to distinguish supporters from opponents, this study 
coded the actors by their sentiment towards the opt-out movement: supporters are those who 
expressed positive sentiment towards the movement; opponents are those with negative sentiment. 
For instance, if a parent teacher association (PTA) encouraged parents to opt out, then the PTA was 
considered as the movement supporter. If a civil rights group issued a press release to criticize the 
opt-out movement, then the group was considered as the movement opponents. As such, the 
differentiation of opponents from supporters provides rich information on how the two opposing 
sides forged coalitions, respectively. Moreover, the coalition ties were recorded if the data suggest: 
(1) the groups and organizations co-participate in an event regarding the opt-out movement, and/or 
(2) they collaborate or interact with one another in the movement. A couple of examples would 
suffice. A coalition tie between the teachers’ union and the Long Island Opt Out group was 
recorded when the media reported that the teachers’ union joined a Long Island Opt Out group’s 
event and distributed the fliers about opting out (Ferrette, 2016). A coalition tie between the New 
York State Education Department and the U.S. Department of Education was recorded when the 
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U.S. Department of Education urged the New York State Education Department in a letter to 
sanction local education agencies with a high opt-out rate, and then the New York State Education 
Department punished the schools with the high opt-out rate by withholding grants (The Lockport 
Union-Sun & Journal, 2016). After identifying the movement actors and their coalition ties, the opt-
out movement’s social networks were visualized and analyzed using the software NodeXL. Further, 
I calculated degree and betweenness centrality of the movement actors to identify who were at the 
center of the network, which suggest who were the major movement actors. I also calculated density 
and fragmentation index of the two subgroups of the movement actors—the supporters and 
opponents—to compare the two opposing coalitions’ network structure. This actor-actor network is 
a one-mode network because it contains only one category of nodes (in this case the movement 
actors) and their coalition ties.  
To capture the larger social context of the opt-out movement, this study further views the 
movement situated in the larger context of the Common Core State Standards and the New York 
State Assessment, as noted in prior literature (Bennett, 2016; Foster, 2016; Pizmony‐Levy & 
Saraisky, 2016). Thus, this study further included these highly salient contextual factors in the 
movement’s two-mode social network (the actor-contextual factor network) which contain two 
categories of nodes (in this case the movement actors and the contextual factors). The two-mode 
social networks have been constructed and analyzed in many policy studies. For instance, in the 
political networks of climate change, the two-mode networks include not only the actors who were 
the witnesses at congressional hearings on climate change, but also the statements made by the 
actors (Fisher, Leifeld, & Iwaki, 2013; Fisher, Waggle, & Leifeld, 2013; Leifeld, 2016). In this study, 
adding the focal issues related to the opt-out movement (i.e., the opt-out movement, the Common 
Core State Standards, and the New York State Assessment) to the network provides a richer 
backdrop of the social context of the movement.  
In doing so, the networks in this study are fundamentally different in two ways from the one 
in Pizmony‐Levy and Saraisky’s (2016) study on the opt-out movement. First, the scopes of the 
networks are different. The social networks in Pizmony‐Levy and Saraisky’s study are at the national 
level, including the opt-out related organizations in various states (e.g., FL Opt Out, GA Opt Out, 
and CA Opt Out). By contrast, this study zoomed in on the state of New York—the state with the 
highest opt-out rate in the country. Second, the natures of network ties are different. The ties in this 
study represent the coalitions between the actors; whereas in Pizmony‐Levy and Saraisky’s study, the 
ties represent the organizations contacted the same survey respondent regarding the opting out.  
One shortfall of network models is that they tend to simplify the rich content of ties to 
dichotomy—whether the tie is present or not (Krinsky, 2010). To date, there has been no good 
solution to this inherent limitation in the network studies of coalitions. The strength of coalition ties 
(i.e., how many times a movement actor is referenced in press coverage) rarely contains unbiased 
information, because reporters and journalists largely decide how often an organization or an 
individual are interviewed (Leifeld, 2016). To surmount this limitation, this study took a close-up 
view of the content of ties by employing Stone’s (2001) framework of policymaking to advance our 
understanding of what major arguments were used by the movement actors to forge coalition ties. 
Therefore, after identifying major actors in the opt-out movement from social network analysis, all 
data in the opt-out corpus were then analyzed from the policy paradox perspective. That is, all 
qualitative data were then coded by Stone’s framework in terms of how the movement goals were 
articulated, how the movement was framed, and what policy solutions were mobilized by different 
actors.  
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Results 
The Social Networks of the Movement  
According to the opt-out corpus, the movement’s actor-actor network is visualized in Figure 
1 to reveal the aggregated categories of the movement actors, and the de-aggregated list of major 
movement actors are displayed in Table 1. In the actor-actor network, the actors in red color 
represent the movement supporters. They comprise the advocacy groups and organizations (e.g., the 
Long Island Opt Out and the New York State Allies for Public Education), the teachers’ unions 
(e.g., the New York State United Teachers and the Levittown United Teachers), the opt-out parents 
and students, as well as the pro-opt-out teachers. By contrast, the actors in blue color represent the 
movement opponents, including the education agencies (e.g., the U.S. Department of Education and 
the New York State Education Department), some civil rights groups (e.g., the Civil and Human 
Rights Coalition), the opposing groups (e.g., the High Achievement New York and the New York 
Campaign for Achievement Now), the Common Core Task Force, some school leaders (e.g., some 
superintendents and school principals), and some parents.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The actor-actor network of the opt-out movement in New York 
Note: The node size is proportional to degree centrality. The purple ties represent positive sentiment shared by the 
actors towards the movement, and the orange ties represent negative sentiment. 
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Table 1 
Major Opt-out Movement Actors in the State of New York  
Supporters Opponents  
Advocacy groups/organizations 
- Class Size Matters 
- Network for Public Education  
- New York State Allies for Public 
Education 
- Long Island Opt Out  
- Opt Out CNY group 
- Stop Common Core in New York State 
Teachers’ unions 
- New York State United Teachers 
- Levittown United Teachers 
- Mahopac Teachers Association 
- Wappingers Congress of Teachers 
- Wantagh United Teachers 
- West Seneca Teachers Association 
Some parent teacher associations 
Opt-out parents 
Opt-out students  
Pro-opt-out teachers 
Education agencies 
- New York State Education Department  
- U.S. Department of Education 
Some civil rights groups 
- Civil and Human Rights Coalition 
- National Council of La Raza 
Opposing groups/organizations 
- High Achievement New York 
- Bellwether Education 
- Rethinking Testing group 
- New York Campaign for Achievement 
Now 
Common Core Task Force 
Some school leaders 
- Some superintendents 
- Some school principals 
Some parents 
 
Who were the central actors in the opt-out movement in New York? According to the 
centrality results in Table 2, for the movement supporters, the pro-opt-out teachers have the highest 
degree (5) and betweenness (3.5) centrality, indicating they are the major actors who have forged the 
largest number of coalition ties with other groups (e.g., the opt-out parents, the opt-out advocacy 
groups, the teachers’ unions, the parent teacher associations, and the opt-out students) to mobilize 
and coordinate resources for the movement. The opt-out parents were also the central actor in the 
movement, having four coalition ties with the parent teachers associations, the opt-out advocacy 
groups, the opt-out students, and the pro-opt-out teachers. For the movement opponents, the New 
York State Education Department has the highest degree (3) and betweenness (3.0) centrality, 
indicating it interacted with the Common Core Task Force, the U.S. Department of Education, and 
the testing providers to address the issues related to the opt-out movement.  
All movement actors in Figure 1 fall into two subgroups: movement supporters in red color 
and movement opponents in blue. The movement supporters were much more well connected by 
the coalitions ties than the opponents, as evidenced by the supporter subgroup’s density (0.6000) 
substantially higher than that of the opponents (0.107). Moreover, the supporter subgroup’s 
fragmentation index is 0, indicating all movement supporters were connected to one another. By 
sharp contrast, the opponent subgroup’s fragmentation index is 0.786, indicating they were highly 
fragmented and no coalition tie was found among some civil rights groups, some school leaders, the 
anti-opt-out parents, and the opt-out opposing groups. The movement supporters’ well-connected 
network structure stands in contrast with the opponents’ fragmented network structure, explaining 
why the movement has gained traction in New York when the opponents, particularly the education 
agencies, had much more authority-based power over standardized testing.  
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Table 2 
Results of social network analysis of the opt-out movement 
  
Degree 
centrality 
Betweenness 
centrality 
Density Fragmentation 
Subgroup 1: movement supporters  
    pro-opt-out teachers 5 3.5 
0.600 0 
    opt-out parents 4 1.0  
    opt-out advocacy groups 3 0.5  
    parent teacher associations 3 0  
    opt-out students 3 0  
    teachers' unions 2 0  
       
Subgroup 2: movement opponents  
    New York State Education Department 3 3.0 
0.107 0.786 
    Common Core Task Force 1 0  
    testing providers 1 0  
    U.S. Department of Education 1 0  
    opt-out opposing groups 0 0   
some civil rights groups 0 0   
    some parents 0 0   
    some school leaders 0 0   
 
After analyzing the actor-actor network of the opt-out movement, this study also visualized 
the actor-contextual factor network in Figure 2. To do so, the focal issues of the movement—the 
Common Core State Standards, the New York State Assessment, and the movement—were added 
to Figure 1. Moreover, the movement actors’ sentiment towards those focal issues were represented 
by ties: positive sentiment in purple, and negative sentiment in orange. To highlight the movement 
actors’ sentiment towards the focal issues, the actors’ coalition ties in Figure 1 were visualized in 
dotted gray lines. In Figure 2, the sentiment ties in the movement’s social network manifest a 
consistent pattern: most movement actors expressed the exact opposite sentiment towards the opt-
out movement and the New York State Assessment, regardless of the actors being the movement 
supporters or opponents. For example, the opt-out parents and the Long Island Opt Out supported 
the movement and expressed negative sentiment towards the New York State Assessment; whereas 
the Civil and Human Rights Coalition and the High Achievement New York criticized the 
movement and expressed positive sentiment towards the New York State Assessment. While this 
finding is not surprising, it clearly demonstrates that standardized testing and the Common Core are 
the focal issues of the movement.  
The Paradoxes of the Movement 
 How did the movement actors forge coalition ties in the network? According to Stone’s 
(2001) framework of policy paradox, it is found that the movement actors on the opposing sides 
articulated contested goals of standardized testing, framed the movement via symbols, numbers, and 
interests, and mobilized policy solutions via inducements, rights, and power. I now present the 
findings in detail on the movement’s goals, framing, and policy solutions.  
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Figure 2. The actor-contextual factor network of the opt-out movement in New York  
 
 Contested goals: Efficiency and equity vs. control over education. In the 
movement, the two opposing sides had contested conceptions of the goals of high-stakes 
standardized testing, leading to competing arguments on the opt-out movement. On the one 
hand, efficiency and equity were the goals of standardized testing upheld by the movement 
opponents. The New York State Education Department and some civil rights groups 
unequivocally asserted that standardized testing was the only objective measure of student 
progress, holding teachers and schools accountable; taxpayers were entitled to know whether 
their money spent on public education was used effectively. For instance, the New York State 
Education Commission MaryEllen Elisa said “the tests are the only objective measure to 
compare and measure student progress” (Stoianoff, 2016, para. 3). In a press release announcing 
their opposition to the opt-out movement, 12 national civil and human rights groups (The 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, The American Association of University 
Women, Association of University Centers on Disabilities, Council of Parent Attorneys and 
Advocates, Inc., Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, League of United Latin 
American Citizens, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, National 
Council of La Raza, National Disability Rights Network, National Urban League, Southeast Asia 
Resource Action Center, and TASH) stated,  
Our commitment to fair, unbiased, and accurate data collection and reporting 
resonates greatest in our work to improve education. The educational outcomes for 
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the children we represent are unacceptable by almost every measurement. And we rely 
on the consistent, accurate, and reliable data provided by annual statewide 
assessments to advocate for better lives and outcomes for our children. These data are 
critical for understanding whether and where there is equal opportunity. (The 
Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, 2015, para. 3)  
 
In an article in The New York Post, Riley (2016) argued that the opt-out movement “deprive[s] 
parents, schools and taxpayer of valuable information about how well (or badly) we are educating 
our kids” (Riley, 2016, para. 1). Therefore, opting out denied the access to student learning data, 
rendering test scores inaccurate in evaluating schools and districts. An opt-out movement opponent 
stated, “You can opt out but you may be opting out of your child’s future” (Donachie, 2016b, para. 
25). 
 Moreover, the movement opponents argued that standardized test scores reveal the 
achievement gap among racial and socioeconomic groups. The opting out in New York was 
concentrated in Long Island’s Nassau and Suffolk counties, two of the wealthiest counties in the 
country, in which more than half of the students opted out of the state standardized tests (Franchi, 
2016). By contrast, according to a recent 2016 PDK/Gallup poll, approximately two-thirds of 
African-Americans (67%) voiced their opposition to opting out, higher than 59% of Americans (Phi 
Delta Kappa International, 2016). Since opting out was concentrated among White and middle class 
(Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016; Ujifusa, 2015), as attested by the hashtag #OptOutIsSoWhite on 
social media, the opt-out parents were “inadvertently making a choice to undermine efforts to 
improve schools for every [emphasis added] child” (Talyor, 2016, para. 2), according to a statement 
by a civil rights group. The movement was thus described as “ridiculous, selfish, and more than a 
little hypocritical” (Riseman, 2016, para. 15) by a co-founder of a nonprofit organization that aims to 
improve educational outcomes for high-needs students.  
On the other hand, the movement’s ardent supporters argued that the goal of high-stakes 
standardized testing revolved around who takes control over education, and thus opting out was to 
take back the control over education. Many opt-out parents saw standardized testing as part of a 
corporate takeover agenda to wring profits from public education by charging districts for testing 
cost, by replacing low-performing schools with charter schools run by for-profit companies, and by 
selling student data to colleges, military recruiters, and businesses (e.g., credit card companies and 
cellphone carriers) (Lederman, 2016; Taylor, 2016). The hashtag #TestingIsSoGreen was thus 
coined on social media. The New York State Education Department’s decision to change the testing 
provider from Pearson Inc. to Questar Assessment Inc. in 2015 did not assuage the movement 
supporters’ dissatisfaction after the revelation that Questar hired its chief assessment officer from 
Pearson (Solnik, 2016). The movement supporters further argued that teachers know their students 
best, and “it is the teachers’ authority to assess students learning”, rather than the tests that take 
place only once a year. As a corollary, the opt-out movement was a means to an end—retaking the 
control over education. 
 The movement framed by symbols, numbers, and interests. The major actors in the 
opt-out movement primarily framed the movement in three ways to build alliances and garner 
public support: symbolic representations, numbers, and interests. First, symbolic representations 
were attested by the helplessness-and-control narratives and the wedge-and-incline argument. In 
the helplessness-and-control narratives told by many parents, the helpless was symbolically 
represented by the students, particularly those with test anxiety and special needs. For instance, 
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Jeanette Deutermann founded the Long Island Opt Out group on Facebook after she 
investigated into her son’s test anxiety, stating, 
I saw it [her son’s test anxiety] emerge a little bit during testing season in third grade. 
… But then the test anxiety became constant in fourth grade. After speaking with 
teachers and parents, I knew it was the testing. (Burris, 2015, para. 3) 
 
Many educators said, “the standardized tests unnecessarily humiliate students with special needs, 
pushing the children to lose their already wobbly self-esteem and hinder their learning” (Finch, 2016, 
para. 8). Further, the anti-Common Core advocates argued, “[the] Common Core-aligned tests are 
too difficult and children with disabilities shouldn't be expected to undertake the same exams” (para. 
8). In the wedge-and-incline argument, standardized testing was metaphorically imagined as the 
wedge: once it gets in the door of public education, education privatization—the metaphoric 
incline—will be pushed through, doing a disservice to students, minority students in particular. This 
argument implies that the first move—standardized testing—should be avoided to prevent the 
inevitable “push” towards the direction of privatizing public education. Jia Lee, an opt-out activist 
and a fourth- and fifth-grade teacher contended that the tests were part of a corporate agenda (NBC 
News, 2016).  
Second, how numbers were used to frame the opt-out movement attests to Stone’s (2001) 
claim that no number is innocent. The movement supporters claimed that standardized test scores 
(numbers) were an invalid measure of student learning, teacher performance, and school 
accountability. Moreover, the two opposing sides fought how to interpret the opt-out rate. When 
the opt-out rate reached a plateau in some districts in 2016, it was interpreted by one side as the 
manifestation of suppression and intimidation—the schools pressuring parents to have their 
children take the tests, and by the other side as the movement losing its steam. The interpretation of 
the movement momentum was in the eye of the beholder, depending on whether they are 
supporters or opponents of the opt-out movement. 
Third, the interests were defined widely different. In the pro-movement framing, students 
were harmed when high-stakes standardized testing provoked undue stress, when the test-driven 
culture took away student learning time to prepare for and administer standardized tests, when 
students were simply defined by test scores, and when student data were sold by testing companies 
as a moneymaker. Teachers were harmed by being taken away their authority over evaluating student 
achievement, and by being tethered invalid standardized test scores to teacher evaluation. Taxpayers 
were harmed by using their hard-earned money to administer for-profit testing companies’ flawed 
standardized tests. In contrast to the pro-movement’s framing of interests, the movement 
opponents framed the movement as White, affluent families’ irresponsible behaviors. Therefore, the 
minority students were harmed, as the school ratings might be in jeopardy, potentially leading to 
decreased school funding. Further, the movement was not framed by the opponents as the 
movement to protect students from excessive testing, but rather the movement led by the “teachers’ 
unions and far-left policy leaders to completely abolish any serious accountability within student 
assessments” (Bennett, 2016, para. 7), according to William Bennett, the former Secretary of 
Education.  
Policy solutions mobilized through inducements, rights, and power.  In the wake of 
the opt-out movement, three policy solutions were primarily mobilized: inducements, rights, and 
power. First, inducements—incentives (e.g., promises and rewards) and deterrence (e.g., threats 
and punishments)—were used simultaneously by the New York State Education Department 
with the attempt to change the opt-out parents’ mind. The positive inducements include the 
state officials promised to (1) shorten state tests by cutting the number of questions; (2) remove 
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test time limits for students, (3) have teachers review the tests; and (4) impose a four-year 
moratorium on using test results to evaluate teachers and principals (The New York State 
Education Department, 2015). Such positive inducements pleased some parents. However , for 
others, such inducements were necessary but not sufficient policy solutions. They saw the 
inducements as “minor, cosmetic changes” and “lip service”. 
Meanwhile, the negative inducements were used by the education agencies in the form of 
top-down threats, sanctions, and punitive regulations targeting the states, districts, and schools with 
a high opt-out rate. In December 2015, the Department of Education sent a letter to all state school 
officials, warning the potential loss of Title I funds and urging states to sanction local education 
agencies with a high opt-out rate (i.e., exceeding 5%) by withholding funds and lower school ratings 
(Strauss, 2016). The high opt-out rate was again addressed in the Department of Education’s 
proposed regulations Section 200.15 stating,  
failure to meet the 95 percent participation rate requirement is factored in the State’s 
accountability system in a meaningful, publicly visible manner through a significant 
impact on a school’s performance level or summative rating, identification for 
targeted support and improvement, or another equally rigorous, State determined 
action, thus providing an incentive [emphasis added] for the school to ensure that all 
students participate in annual State assessments. (The U.S. Department of 
Education, 2016)  
 
At the state level, in 2016 the New York State Education Department kept 99 schools off the 
Reward School list, and 16 New York City schools were ruled ineligible for up to $75,000 in grants, 
due to the high opt-out rate (The Lockport Union-Sun & Journal, 2016). The schools’ loss of 
funding, according to the Regents Chancellor Betty Rose, was not a punishment but rather 
“unintended consequences”. While the semantics of “incentive” and “unintended consequences” are 
distinct from “punishment”, they were interpreted the same by the movement supporters as the 
punishments.  
In addition, some opt-out parents claimed that they and their children were punished, in the 
form of harassment and intimidation, for exercising their right to opt out of the state standardized 
tests. Yvonne Gasperino, founder and administrator of the Stop Common Core in New York State 
Facebook page, said harassment, intimation, and punishment were a common experience shared by 
the opt-out parents, including “favoritism … grade extortion, personal phone calls by some teachers 
trying to influence the parent’s decision, bribery via contests with monetary or other rewards, and 
exerting authority over the children who refused. … [as well as] children being reprimanded by some 
school officials for decisions their parents made on their behalf” (White, 2016, para. 9). In fact, the 
opt-out parents were called “unreasonable” and the pro-opt-out teachers were called “unethical” by 
the New York State Education Commissioner MaryEllen Elia (Spotlight News, 2016).  
Another policy solution revolved around the parents’ right of opting out. The New York 
City Councilman Daniel Dromm argued that the New York State Education Department “has not 
done an adequate job of informing parents of their rights” (Donachie, 2016a, para. 3), even though 
the City Council approved a resolution on March 31, 2015, requesting the State Education 
Department to amend the Parents’ Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to include the information 
about how parents can opt their children out of testing. The opt-out supporters claimed that 
education officials not informing parents of their opt-out right contributed to the opt-out 
population skewing toward wealthy and White families. Further, the Capital Region Republican 
Assemblyman Jim Tedisco wrote a letter to the Regents Chancellor Betty Rosa, asking for her 
support for the Common Core Parental Refusal Act which codified the parents’ right to opt their 
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children out of tests (Willard, 2016). Moreover, deriving from the parents’ right to opt out is the 
teachers’ right to inform parents of opting out. A spokeswoman for the New York City Schools 
Chancellor Carmen Fariña said teachers should not advise parents to opt out if they speak as 
representatives of the Department of Education; whereas the teachers argued that the lines between 
their identities as educators and private citizens were blurry.  
Facing the negative inducements and the ambiguity in parents’ opt-out right, some parents 
resorted to the third policy solution: gaining authority-based power in the policymaking system. 
Some opt-out parents were elected and won their seats in the districts’ school board. In doing so, 
they gained the power to advocate for “a more holistic” education approach that goes beyond test 
scores, placing focus on the whole child. In one district, three Long Island Opt Out-endorsed board 
members were elected in 2015 to serve on the nine-member board (Franchi, 2016). In addition to 
amassing power at the local level, the Long Island Opt Out group was active at the state level by 
strongly supporting the election of Todd Kaminsky (D-Long Beach) to the State Senate, who 
sponsored the bill that untethered teacher evaluation from standardized testing scores, and wrote a 
letter to the Secretary of Education John King to urge the Department of Education to reconsider 
its decision to punish school districts with the high opt-out rate (The New York State Senate, 2016). 
Discussion 
The opt-out movement in New York presents a unique case in a state with the highest opt-
out rate in the United States in 2015 and 2016. This study illustrates the social networks and 
examines the paradoxes that have propelled and will continue to galvanize the opt-out movement. 
In addition to identifying the supporters and opponents as the major movement actors, the findings 
of this study demonstrate how the movement actors forged coalition ties by articulating contested 
goals, framing the movement, and mobilizing policy solutions. By revealing the paradoxes of the 
opt-out movement—the way the opposing sides clash, the points of contention, and the movement 
actors’ strategies and approaches, the findings of this study have profound and timely policy 
implications as the movement actors seek and advance on common ground and capitalize on the 
movement to make substantive changes in education policy for the interest of students.  
The Grassroots Approach to Influence and Power in Education Policymaking 
One intriguing finding of this study is the grassroots approach to amassing influence and 
power in education policymaking. The pro-opt-out teachers were the most central actors, followed 
by the opt-out parents, the opt-out advocacy groups, the parent teacher associations, and the opt-
out students. They emerged as the central actors in the opt-out movement as they built coalition ties 
with one another to mobilize and coordinate resources, thereby accruing influence and power. This 
finding is in contrast to Song et al.’s (2005) study in which the non-government actors had much less 
influence than the government actors in reading curriculum policymaking at the state level. While 
the authority-based power in education policymaking is not equally distributed among stakeholders 
and “more diffused and weaker interest are less likely to organize effective groups to represent their 
‘latent’ opinions” (Glynn & Herbst, 2015, p. 98), the non-government actors, most of whom 
emerged as the opt-out movement supporters, brought their voice on standardizing testing to the 
fore and pressured educational officials to address them. They did so by forging coalition ties 
through interacting with allies regarding the movement’s goal, framing, and policy solutions 
strategically and consistently. 
First, the movement supporters forged coalition ties by deliberately communicating with 
allies the movement’s goal. By stating the movement’s goal as parents and teachers re-taking control 
over education, the movement supporters not only mobilized the existing social networks (e.g., the 
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social interactions between teachers and parents in the teacher parent associations), but also built 
alliance with the teachers’ unions and many advocacy groups such as the Network for Public 
Education Foundation, the New York State Allies for Public Education, Class Size Matters, the Stop 
Common Core in New York State. The deliberately crafted argument on the parents’ loss of control 
over education not only motivated many parents to act beyond their parochial interests in their own 
children to advocate for the policy change in standardized testing, but also forged a broad, unifying 
coalition that brought together the movement supporters in a coordinated opposition to the current 
policies on standardized testing. The coalition then empowered the movement supporters, mostly 
non-government actors, to overcome the institutional obstacles of not having much authority-based 
power by amassing social influence in the movement, thereby propelling the movement forward.  
Second, the movement supporters forged coalition ties by consistently communicating the 
movement’s goal, framing the movement, and mobilizing policy solutions. The movement’s goal of 
re-taking control over education was consistent with the helplessness-and-control narratives and the 
wedge-and-incline argument used in the supporter’s framing of the movement, and was also 
consistent with advocating for parents’ right of opting out, and engaging in the elections at the local 
school board level and state level. To change the status quo of high-stakes standardized testing and 
to re-take control over education, it took more than just arguing for the right of opting out of state 
standardized tests. One of the adamant opt-out movement supporters—the Long Island Opt Out—
accrued influence and power in the policymaking by engaging in the process of electing school 
board members at the district level and a pro-opt-out senator at the state level. Gaining the power 
seats at the policymaking table was particularly important for the opt-out movement, when many 
education officials as the power holders resorted to a repertoire of hardline intimidating tactics—
including threats, sanctions, and punitive regulations—to suppress the movement. By gaining access 
to the power of making policies, the movement supporters did not stay in the shadow of existing 
power holders or were marginalized to the periphery in the movement’s social network, but forged 
coalition ties in the network to chart a course with an attempt to bring about policy change on 
standardized testing. This grassroots approach is validated by the finding that the movement 
supporters’ well-connected network structure stands in contrast with the opponents’ fragmented 
network structure, explaining why the movement has gained traction in New York when the 
opponents, particularly the education agencies, had much more authority-based power over 
standardized testing. The findings of this study are also consistent with the central themes of social 
movement theory (e.g., resource mobilization structure, institutions and organizations, belief system, 
tactical repertoires, and collective action) (Morris, 1984, 1999; Morris & Mueller, 1992). The 
movement supporters (the institutions and organizations) used the re-taking control argument 
(belief system), along with other tactics (e.g., using social media to communicate and distribute 
opting out information, as well as engaging in school board and state senate elections) to build 
coalition ties (resource mobilization structure) in the opt-out movement (collective action). In doing 
so, they took the grassroots approach to overcome the institutional barriers and amass power and 
influence.   
The Future of the Opt-out Movement 
What does the future hold for the opt-out movement? While it is still too soon to judge the 
future, the staying power of the movement is incumbent upon how the movement’s social networks 
continue to evolve. Here I provide a couple of possibilities. First, if the movement supporters 
continue to strengthen current coalition ties and build new ones, the movement might be afoot to 
the substantive change to the policies on standardized testing in the state of New York. The 
literature on advocacy coalitions (Henry, Lubell, & McCoy, 2010; Leifeld, 2013; Weible & Sabatier, 
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2005) suggests that the policy beliefs have a homophily effect on coalitions—actors tend to form 
coalition ties with those who share similar policy beliefs, thereby leading to fragmented subgroups 
with different ideologies. To sustain the opt-out movement momentum, it is critical that the 
movement supporters continue to build coalition ties with those who have not engaged in the 
movement but potentially agree with the movement supporters’ goal, problem framing, and policy 
solutions. Further, consider the opt-out movement from the perspective of the diffusion of 
innovation (Rogers, 2003). If the movement is conceptualized as an innovation—a practice that is 
perceived as new regardless of the objective newness, then the movement’s future—how the movement 
will be diffused—is subject to four elements: adopters, communication channels, social system, and 
time. Regarding the adopters of the opt-out movement, the 21% of the opt-out rate in New York in 
2016 has already exceeded the threshold of 2.5% of innovators and 13.5% of early adopters. If the 
communication channels and social system (i.e., social networks) remain strong and continue to 
grow, then over the time the opt-out movement is unlikely to dissolve.  
Second, the implementation of the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) will have salient 
implications on how the opt-out movement unfolds. While ESSA does require at least 95% of 
public school students participating in annual state assessments of student achievement, it grants 
much control to each state over how the 95% participation rate is factored into the statewide 
accountability system (ESSA, 2015). Further, ESSA states that “Nothing in this paragraph [on 
assessments] shall be construed as preempting a State or local law regarding the decision of a parent 
to not have the parent’s child participate in the academic assessments” (ESSA, 2015, §1111.(b) (2) 
(K)). With the states having control over the consequences of opting out and the parents’ right of 
opting out, state education agencies have much maneuver in using negative inducements—such as 
threats and punishment—as policy solutions to suppress the opt-out movement. However, such 
negative inducements would create a climate of conflicts and resentment. Even if the threats (e.g., 
withholding funding) are not carried out, they draw the irk and engender the distrust between the 
movement supporters and opponents, reinforcing the helplessness-and-control framing used by the 
movement supporters to garner even broader public support. Moreover, the threats and 
punishments imposed by the state education agencies might harm student interest—the very group’s 
interest they intend to protect. Withdrawing the Title 1 funds would deprive the students, 
particularly minority students and students with low socioeconomic status, of equitable education.  
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Inquiry 
This study has three major limitations. First, the data collected for this study might not 
provide a full, comprehensive view of the opt-out movement in New York. The data sources for 
this study are press coverage and archival documents, suggesting the movement actors and coalition 
ties identified in this study are notable enough to be documented by media and archival documents. 
While much of the data in this study come from liberal, centrist, and conservative press coverage, it 
is still necessary to take into account the nuanced political bias of media. For instance, some may 
argue The New York Times is a liberal newspaper, but it is quite conservative in its coverage on 
education and education policy. Moreover, it is possible that some movement actors and their 
coalition ties are missing or unidentifiable in the opt-out corpus compiled for this study. If the 
movement actors use private communication channels via emails, phone calls, and face-to-face 
conversations, then it is unknown to the researcher that some major movement actors and their ties 
might be missing. More diverse data sources are therefore recommended for future inquiry. Second, 
this study only examines one single state of New York—the state with the highest opt-out rate in 
the country in 2015 and 2016. While New York represents a unique case, the opt-out movement in 
other states merits further investigation as well. The opt-out students in New York were 
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disproportionately White in families with relatively high socioeconomic status (Franchi, 2016; 
Pizmony‐Levy & Saraisky, 2016); however, other states might not share the same racial, 
socioeconomic pattern. For instance, in Ohio there was not much disparity in the opt-out rate 
between White, wealthy communities and communities of color and low-income communities 
(Neill, 2016). Thus, further studies on the opt-out movement in multiple states are highly 
encouraged. Third, this study offers only a snapshot of the movement. Given the intimate interplay 
among the movement, the Common Core, and standardized testing, it is of paramount importance 
to longitudinally examine whether and how the movement continues to influence educational 
policymaking regarding the Common Core and standardized testing.   
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